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Abstract
Literature suggests that ‘negative advertising’
is an effective way to encourage behavioral
changes, but it has enjoyed limited use in public
health media campaigns. However, as public
health increasingly focuses on non-communica-
ble disease prevention, negative advertising
could be more widely applied. This analysis
considers an illustrative case from tobacco con-
trol. Relying on internal tobacco industry docu-
ments, surveys and experimental data and
drawing from political advocacy literature, we
describe tobacco industry and public health re-
search on the American Legacy Foundation’s
‘‘truth’’ campaign, an example of effective neg-
ative advertising in the service of public health.
The tobacco industry determined that the most
effective advertisements run by Legacy’s
‘‘truth’’ campaign were negative advertise-
ments. Although the tobacco industry’s own re-
search suggested that these negative ads
identified and effectively reframed the cigarette
as a harmful consumer product rather than fo-
cusing solely on tobacco companies, Philip Mor-
ris accused Legacy of ‘vilifying’ it. Public
health researchers have demonstrated the effec-
tiveness of the ‘‘truth’’ campaign in reducing
smoking initiation. Research on political advo-
cacy demonstrating the value of negative adver-
tising has rarely been used in the development
of public health media campaigns, but negative
advertising can effectively communicate certain
public health messages and serve to counter
corporate disease promotion.
Introduction
Media campaigns are widely recognized as useful
public health tools [1], particularly given that mass
media campaigns can, by themselves, change health
behavior without the need for multiple channels of
communication [2]. Psychological and political re-
search on advertising and persuasion suggests that
certain kinds of messages motivate change, partic-
ularly messages about trust [3, 4]. Yet a review of
mass media public health campaigns up to 1998
argued that such campaigns have not historically
been theory based, and that when theory is consid-
ered, it is drawn primarily from social psychologi-
cal theories not developed for media use [1, 2].
Traditionally, many public health campaigns
have focused on increasing individuals’ knowledge
about disease risks, expecting that this increased
knowledge will lead to changed behavior [1, 2,
5]. However, individuals’ feelings about activities
with health consequences predict behavior better
than their knowledge of the risks incurred. Specifi-
cally, people perceive that their health is more at
risk when they feel reduced trust [3].
Most public health campaigns have underempha-
sized the importance of trust messages in motivat-
ing behavior change [3]. Instead, social marketing,
a method of promoting healthy behaviors that relies
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on methods developed in product advertising, has
become popular [6, 7]. Recent research claims that
less than one-third of public health campaigns de-
velop messages based on research that identifies the
social determinants of attitudes and behavior
change [1].
In recent years, public health researchers and
advocates have called attention to structural and
social causes of illness and premature death [8, 9].
Public health advocacy frequently confronts exist-
ing corporate practices [10] which are implicated in
health problems such as obesity, tobacco, alcohol
and other drug use, as well as in risks posed by
automobiles, guns and pharmaceuticals [9]. Corpo-
rate behavior is increasingly recognized as a funda-
mental cause of disease [9, 11], and developing
ways to challenge health-damaging corporate be-
havior is a key emerging issue in public health ad-
vocacy. Addressing diseases with social causes
requires that public health advocates convince peo-
ple, in the face of extensive product advertising by
corporations, to reduce or eliminate use of products
that increase disease risk. This may involve
addressing risk perception through counter market-
ing; specifically, reducing trust can heighten popu-
lar awareness of risk [3].
The marketing of products that increase health
risks also creates a ‘share of voice’ problem for
public health media campaigns. Health messages
are viewed far less frequently than other media mes-
sages urging behavior that increases health risks,
particularly consumption [12]. Public health adver-
tisements may be inadvertently packaged with
product advertisements that undercut their message
(see Fig. 1). Public health campaigns cannot be
successful without addressing these competing
messages, but they must do so with far fewer
resources than are available for corporate product
advertising [1, 12]. In addition to advertising
disease-promoting products, businesses use posi-
tive advocacy advertising in an effort to improve
their popular images [7]. Thus, corporations have
Fig. 1. Mixed messages on two billboards in Oakland, California (2005). Source: Jeff Williams, September 2005.
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significant financial and structural advantages over
public health advocates in conveying both con-
sumption and public relations messages [9]. Positive
advertising, including product advertising and cor-
porate image promotion, usually encourages people
to rely on their comfort with the status quo [13].
Research that has specifically addressed public
health issues related to social and environmental
risk factors suggests that media campaigns should
be based on political advocacy tactics rather than
social psychology [7]. Political campaigns have de-
veloped a large repertoire of effective tactics, many
based on what is commonly referred to as ‘negative
advertising’ [4]. Although the term negative adver-
tising is not always clearly defined, it is generally
regarded as consisting of messages intended to at-
tack, criticize or discredit opponents and oppo-
nents’ messages, rather than messages designed to
promote a preferred alternative [4, 14]. Most re-
search on negative advertising used in political
campaigns has focused on its possible depressive
effect on voter turnout, but studies also note that it
is often more salient than other kinds of advocacy
[15]. It reaches people who were previously disin-
terested and not engaged with an issue [16], is par-
ticularly useful for groups that have limited funding
and popular exposure [17] and is effective in re-
ducing audience trust in the subject of attack [18].
Negative political advertising, even when it relies
on emotional appeals, cues rational decision mak-
ing by increasing attentiveness to potential prob-
lems and encouraging people to reconsider their
established opinions [13]. These new attitudes,
which are based on reasoning rather than reflexive
comfort with the status quo, are far more resistant to
change once they have been established than are
status quo beliefs [18]. This constellation of featur-
es—high salience, broad appeal, effectiveness de-
spite limited exposure, trust reduction and the
creation of attitudes that are resistant to change—-
suggests the immense potential value of negative
advertising for public health campaigns that deal
with social and environmental risk factors, particu-
larly those involving corporate activity.
Tobacco control advocacy has been at the lead-
ing edge of public health efforts to change corporate
practices that affect public health [9], and its suc-
cesses and failures offer insight for future public
health campaigns. Counter marketing against to-
bacco was originally established as a public health
strategy between 1968 and 1970, when the federal
Fairness Doctrine required that the airing of ciga-
rette advertisements in the mass media be balanced
by advertisements promoting reduced tobacco con-
sumption [7]. The success of these early efforts was
largely realized in hindsight. After the requirement
for counter marketing was eliminated by the Fed-
eral Communications Commission ban on televised
tobacco advertising, cigarette consumption in-
creased once more [19].
In this paper, we consider a case study of nega-
tive advertising, the ‘‘truth’’ campaign developed
by the American Legacy Foundation, to show the
effectiveness of this tactic in both reducing con-
sumption of tobacco and forcing the tobacco indus-
try to develop new strategies to combat the
campaign, most of which were ineffective. How-
ever, the American Legacy Foundation faced
unique constraints on its activities and funding.
We conclude that advocacy by other public health
groups could be far more aggressive and potentially
more effective in the long term.
Methods
We relied on a variety of sources, including pub-
lished and unpublished research on tobacco control
advertising campaigns and internal tobacco indus-
try documents detailing communications between
tobacco industry representatives and public health
advocates. Over 40 million pages of internal indus-
try documents have been released to the public in
conjunction with the Master Settlement Agreement
(MSA), a legal settlement between 46 state Attor-
neys General and the major tobacco companies in
the United States. These documents are web acces-
sible at the Legacy Tobacco Documents Library
[20]. Industry documents used in this paper were
retrieved between September 2005 and January
2007. These included internal corporate documents
detailing the activities of the tobacco industry in
Public health campaigns and negative advertising
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response to ‘‘truth’’ as well as transcripts and stills
of advertisements from tobacco control organiza-
tions, including more than 60 ‘‘truth’’ spots the in-
dustry identified as having been aired by the
American Legacy Foundation. We also reviewed
correspondence between the American Legacy
Foundation and Philip Morris regarding studies of
the ‘‘truth’’ campaign, forwarded by Legacy for the
purposes of this research.
Using previously established techniques for sys-
tematically searching tobacco documents archives
[21], we began with initial search terms such as
organizational names (e.g. ‘American Legacy
Foundation’) and references to media campaigns
(‘‘truth’’). Searches were expanded with a snowball
strategy using contextual information from initial
searches to identify additional search terms and rel-
evant documents, including names of individuals
and organizations, date ranges, places and reference
(Bates) numbers. Over 1200 internal tobacco indus-
try documents pertaining to post-MSA media cam-
paigns were identified and screened for relevance.
Many of the initial documents we found were cop-
ies of contemporaneous public information such as
press releases; these were frequently duplicative or
irrelevant to our analysis. We drew on approxi-
mately 150 documents, dated 2000–04, to prepare
this paper. Our interpretative data analysis involved
reviewing the documents and transcripts to identify
recurring themes and corporate positions, which we
analyzed through the lens of studies of public health
and political advocacy based on both experimental
and survey data. We also reviewed secondary data
sources for corroborating information about media
campaigns including newspaper and journal
articles, accessed via LexisNexis and PubMed,
and through Internet searches using Google.
Results
The ‘‘truth’’ campaign, 1998–2002
The ‘‘truth’’ media campaign was first launched in
Florida in April 1998 as part of an integrated state
tobacco control program aimed at reducing teen
smoking. The American Legacy Foundation, cre-
ated in 1999 as part of the MSA, expanded on this
campaign as part of its mandate to create a nation-
wide educational program to reduce youth smok-
ing. Initially, the campaign mirrored the Florida
program closely, in part because Chuck Wolfe,
the architect of the Florida ‘‘truth’’ campaign,
was hired to develop Legacy’s program [22]. Leg-
acy, however, had a much greater budget, initially
$100 million per year [23], and directed its cam-
paign to a national audience beginning in February
2000. The campaign, as Legacy had hoped, led to
a decline in youth smoking rates both during and
after its 2000–02 broadcasts [23, 24], as well as
decreasing receptivity to pro-tobacco industry mes-
sages [25]. The goal of ‘‘truth’’ was to counter
market against tobacco products to teens at risk of
smoking [24]. The core strategy of the campaign
was to market its antismoking, anti-industry mes-
sage as a brand or product [24]. In discussions of
the campaign and its effectiveness, this shift in def-
inition from advocacy to a ‘product’ was consid-
ered to be a crucial factor in its success [26–28].
The identification of ‘‘truth’’ as a product led to
advertising for the campaign in many of the same
ways that cigarettes are advertised; the campaign
provided paraphernalia such as T-shirts in addition
to developing and running advertisements [24].
Negative advertisements created by ‘‘truth’’
were one of the most memorable features of the
campaign. One advertisement, titled ‘Body Bags’,
became emblematic of engagement of the tobacco
industry [29] and was shown to be the most effec-
tive of the ‘‘truth’’ ads [26]. In it, a group of teens
pulled up outside the Philip Morris (now Altria)
corporate headquarters in New York City and
stacked 1200 body bags onto the sidewalk in front
of the building, yelling into a megaphone that these
body bags represented the number of people killed
by smoking every day (Transcript, Table I). An-
other advertisement, ‘Hypnosis’, also addressed to-
bacco companies directly, showing two young men
in a van driving to a neighborhood where tobacco
executives supposedly lived and broadcasting
a taped message aimed at ‘reprogramming’ them:
‘I am a good person. Selling a product that kills
people makes me uncomfortable’ (Transcript,
D. E. Apollonio and R. E. Malone
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Table II) [30]. These ads presented not smoking as
a statement against industry power, manipulation
and authority, appealing to the teen desire to rebel
[24]. Although some ‘‘truth’’ ads referred exclu-
sively to the diseases caused by smoking and
toxic constituents of smoke [31–36], others pointed
out that tobacco companies profited from selling
products that killed their customers [37–42],
showed posters for cigarettes that were placed at
children’s eye level in convenience stores [43–45]
and pointed out the implausibility of the claim
that cigarette additives like ammonia and urea
were included to improve the flavor of cigarettes
[46, 47].
The tobacco industry responds: ‘youth
smoking prevention’ and vilification
Although all the major tobacco companies attacked
the Legacy campaign (Philip Morris threatened to
file suit and Lorillard did; the suit was eventually
dropped) [48], Philip Morris developed the most
sophisticated response, focus group testing a variety
of potential responses to ‘‘truth’’ within a few months
of the February 2000 campaign launch (Timeline,
Table III) [49]. In 1997, Philip Morris had begun an
‘image makeover’ for the company through its
‘PM21’ public relations campaign, which attemp-
ted to establish a new, more positive corporate iden-
tity [50–52]. Consistent with this makeover strategy
[53], beginning in May 2000, the company con-
ducted focus group testing of the ‘‘truth’’ advertise-
ments it considered most problematic, in order to
develop a set of ‘best responses’ that it hoped would
limit the damage of the campaign [49, 54]. The
strategy it ultimately developed was similar to
efforts that have been developed by the staff of
political campaigns to ‘inoculate’ candidates for
elective office against negative campaigning [55].
The company attempted to generate positive feel-
ings about Philip Morris through public relations
campaigns designed to displace ‘‘truth’’ messages,
including emphasizing its own youth smoking pre-
vention (YSP) programs. While the company was
developing this campaign, it also strategized ways
to eliminate Legacy’s most effective ‘‘truth’’ ads
through behind-the-scenes lobbying.
Philip Morris researchers immediately identified
the relationship between many of the ‘‘truth’’ spots
and negative advertising. Legacy characterized
its campaign as selling a brand or product called
‘‘truth’’, but Philip Morris viewed Legacy’s efforts
as comparable to political campaigning, as revealed
Table II. Transcript of ‘‘truth’’ advertisement: Hypnosis [30]
[Two men are driving through a residential area in a van.]
[Man 1] ‘I’m feelin’ the vibe. We’re going to find these tobacco
guys.’
[Man 2] ‘Hey man, do you know if there are any tobacco
executives around here?’
[Man 3] ‘No.’
[Man 1] ‘Do you know if any tobacco executives live around
here?’
[Man 4] ‘Go three blocks down. Make a left. You’ll see some
big houses.’
[Man 1] ‘Look at the size of this house.’
[Man 2] ‘I guess working for an industry that kills over 1,000
people a day pays pretty well.’
[Man 1] ‘We gotta help these people out. Throw in the tape.’
[Man 2] ‘Yeah, get the tape. Good call.’
[Tape amplified from the van] ‘I am a good person. Selling
a product that kills people makes me uncomfortable. I realize
cigarettes are addictive.’
[Man 2] ‘Looks like money is addictive too.’
[Tape] ‘. and kill over 430,000 people each year. Tomorrow
I will look for a new job. I will be less concerned with covering
my butt and more concerned with doing the right thing.’
[Resident yelling] ‘Shut up!’
[Man 1] ‘We’re just trying to help.’
Table I. Transcript of ‘‘truth’’ advertisement: Body Bags [29, 112]
[View from outside Philip Morris USA, where several youths are piling up body bags on the sidewalk. There are shots of Philip Morris
employees looking out the windows.]
[Man with megaphone] ‘We’ve got a question. Do you know how many people tobacco kills every day? You know what? We are going
to leave this here for you so you can see what 1,200 people actually look like.’
Public health campaigns and negative advertising
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in an unpublished Philip Morris strategy document
from May 2000:
Not only do [Legacy] ads outweigh ours on
gross-rating-point terms, but there is also strong
evidence that negative advertising is consider-
ably more powerful and effective—spot for
spot—than positive advertising. (In typical polit-
ical campaigns it is not unusual to see a very
high-quality positive ad move a candidate up 3-
5 points in a week but it is also common to see
a high-quality negative ad move an opponent
down by 10-15 points in a week) [56].
The fact that these advertisements negatively
portrayed the industry as promoting a deadly prod-
uct also offered tobacco companies a unique avenue
to try to eliminate the campaign. In the 1998 MSA
that created the American Legacy Foundation [57],
tobacco companies had demanded the inclusion of
a ‘vilification’ clause intended to preclude Legacy
from airing ads similar to those developed in the
original Florida ‘‘truth’’ campaign. The industry
claimed those ads were ‘gratuitously vicious’ and
‘infamous’ [58]. The vilification clause stipulated
that education funds provided to Legacy ‘shall be
used only for public education and advertising re-
garding the addictiveness, health effects, and social
costs related to the use of tobacco products and
shall not be used for any personal attack on, or
vilification of, any person (whether by name or
business affiliation), company or governmental
agency, whether individually or collectively’ [57].
Philip Morris initially sought to limit ‘‘truth’’ by
asserting that the ads vilified the industry, violating
the terms of the MSA. The term vilification, how-
ever, is ambiguous [48, 59], and even tobacco in-
dustry executives disagreed internally about its
meaning. When the Body Bags ad was first aired
in February 2000, one executive argued ‘I contend
that the [Body Bags ad] could be construed as vil-
ification regardless of how they use it’ [60]. In
March 2000, executives at the company continued
to argue among themselves about what constituted
Table III. Timeline of ‘‘truth’’ campaign and responses
1997 Philip Morris launches ‘public image campaign’ titled PM21 to differentiate itself from
other tobacco companies.
April 1998 Florida ‘‘truth’’ campaign launches.
1998 MSA signed.
1999 American Legacy Foundation created by MSA.
February–March 2000 Legacy ‘‘truth’’ campaign launches; Philip Morris executives attempt to define vilification,
establish Vilification Task Force.
May 2000 Philip Morris strategy document identifies ‘‘truth’’ ads as negative advertising; suggests focus
on corporate YSP efforts as response.
June 2000 Philip Morris focus group report reviews opinions of ‘‘truth’’ ads and findings about possible
corporate responses.
September–November 2000 Philip Morris runs additional focus groups to test ‘‘truth’’ ads against potential responses,
focused on publicizing corporate YSP efforts.
November 2001 Legacy presents findings at conference that ‘‘truth’’ is effective at reducing youth smoking,
while Philip Morris YSP programs increase willingness to smoke.
December 2001–January 2002 Philip Morris repeatedly requests meetings with Legacy to obtain its dataset and reanalyze it.
February 2002 Legacy reports it will make data publicly available upon publication of findings.
March–May 2002 Philip Morris continues to demand Legacy data prior to publication, seeking intervention
from Attorneys General.
June 2002 Legacy findings published in American Journal of Public Health; data released.
March 2003 Philip Morris requests that Attorneys General constrain Legacy by eliminating a subset
of ‘‘truth’’ ads on grounds they constitute vilification.
July 2003 Philip Morris drafts guidelines for what constitutes appropriate ‘‘truth’’ ads.
2004 Legacy’s guaranteed educational funding terminated, dramatically limiting scope of
‘‘truth’’ campaign.
D. E. Apollonio and R. E. Malone
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vilification, with one saying ‘we may need to think
about the difference between ads that depict ‘‘in-
dustry manipulation’’ and those that ‘‘vilify the
industry’’.’ [61] and others disagreeing [62], stat-
ing that ‘identifying vilification is in the eye of the
beholder’ and the company’s perspective was what
was relevant [63].
In March 2000, Philip Morris developed an in-
ternal ‘Vilification Task Force’ to create a coherent
strategic response to the ‘‘truth’’ ads. Initially, the
task force attempted to summarize the evidence
about the effectiveness of counter marketing [64],
but noted ‘While there is debate on the effective-
ness of vilification ads, our opposition is not based
on this idea.we oppose on principal [sic]’ [65]. In
May 2000, the task force attempted to ‘settle on a
definition of vilification or develop a criteria [sic]
against which ads can be measured’ [65, 66]. (We
found no evidence that such a definition was ever
determined.) By late May 2000, it had developed
a list of potential public Philip Morris responses to
‘‘truth’’ for testing in focus groups [67], ranging
from claims that ‘‘truth’’ ads violated the MSA to
the general idea that ‘It is wrong to teach kids
to hate’. These proposed responses were used to
develop a ‘‘truth and differentiation’’ campaign in
May 2000 intended to reposition Philip Morris rel-
ative to other tobacco companies [56]. The most
effective of the responses tested related not to vili-
fication but to efforts to publicize YSP efforts [68].
The ‘‘truth’’ and differentiation campaign began
by gathering impressions of specific ‘‘truth’’ ads in
three US cities in May and June 2000 [68], including
Hypnosis and Body Bags. The June report discussing
these focus group responses noted that ‘For the Body
Bag [sic] ad, most focus group respondents say the
main message is that ‘‘smoking/tobacco kills’’. This
ad seems to bring more focus on the product than the
manufacturers or their employees’ [68]. These find-
ings are consistent with recent experimental research
on Legacy advertisements [69], which show that
negative perceptions created by anti-industry adver-
tisements were directed toward the product.
Philip Morris ran additional focus groups from
September to November 2000 that presented fake
news to test ‘‘truth’’ ads and potential corporate
responses to them [49, 70–73]. One of the key strat-
egies identified by the company in its May 2000
strategy document regarding potential responses to
‘‘truth’’ was to emphasize its own YSP activities,
which were identified as ‘an extremely positive influ-
ence on attitudes toward the tobacco industry’ [56].
The focus groups it developed from September to
November 2000 emphasized this message. Within
a year, however, Legacy’s continuing research on
‘‘truth’’ undercut the Philip Morris strategy. In No-
vember 2001, the Legacy foundation presented data
showing that the ‘‘truth’’ campaign was effective in
reducing youth smoking, while the primary Philip
Morris YSP program, entitled ‘Think, Don’t Smoke’,
increased the likelihood of youth smoking [74].
Immediately after Legacy’s conference presenta-
tion, Carolyn Levy, who headed the Philip Morris
YSP program, wrote to Legacy to request a meeting,
noting: ‘I was disturbed by some of the results you
reported .’ [74–76]. After that meeting, she
requested in December 2001 that Legacy send its
raw data to Philip Morris immediately to allow the
company to ‘best decide on a future course of ac-
tion’ [77], repeating this request throughout Janu-
ary and February 2002 [78–81]. Legacy responded
in February 2002: ‘We are in the process of pre-
paring a dataset for public use that will allow anal-
ysis of the results. As I mentioned in our previous
correspondence, there is enormous public interest in
our dataset, and we are working to develop data use
and sharing protocols so we can meet this demand’
[82]. Philip Morris, however, believed it should
have the opportunity to review all of Legacy’s data
before publication of the study’s findings, sending
repeated requests between February and May 2002
to both Legacy and the Attorneys General who reg-
ulated Legacy’s activities under the MSA [83–87].
The company complained that Legacy ‘has de-
clined to share its raw data’ [88] despite the foun-
dation’s repeated responses that it would make the
data publicly available upon the publication of its
study, which occurred in June 2002 [89–91]. We
found no evidence that the Attorneys General con-
tacted by the company responded.
By 2003, internal corporate research and Legacy’s
peer-reviewed research made the effectiveness of
Public health campaigns and negative advertising
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the ‘‘truth’’ campaign and the ineffectiveness of the
Philip Morris YSP program obvious. The company
returned to efforts to eliminate ‘‘truth’’ ads on the
grounds that they constituted vilification. Philip
Morris requested in March 2003 that the Attorneys
General apply a new code of conduct to Legacy’s
advertising activities that would eliminate what
it defined as ‘vilifying’ advertisements [92]. At the
request of the Attorneys General supervising Leg-
acy, Philip Morris developed a discussion draft of
guidelines designed to control what Philip Morris
believed were the most threatening of Legacy’s
‘‘truth’’ advertisements in July 2003 [58]. It claimed
that:
The MSA and ALF’s [American Legacy Foun-
dation’s] by laws [sic] recognize a clear distinc-
tion between conduct or communications that
attack tobacco products or consumption—which
is permitted—and conduct or communications
that attack or disparage tobacco companies or
their employees—which is prohibited’ [emphasis
in original] [93].
Philip Morris provided examples of ‘‘truth’’
advertisements that it believed complied with the
standard it had created. Advertisements such as
‘400,000 A Year’, which stated ‘Tobacco kills over
400,000 Americans a year. That’s more than sui-
cide, traffic accidents, murder, illicit drugs, and al-
cohol, combined’ were acceptable. However, Body
Bags and Hypnosis were not because they ‘ascribe
malevolent motives or indifference to Tobacco
Companies or Employees with respect to the health
effects of smoking’ [93]. This claim directly contra-
dicted the company’s own earlier research finding
that Body Bags drew attention to the health risks of
tobacco products rather than to tobacco companies.
We found no evidence indicating how the Attorneys
General responded to these proposed guidelines.
Ultimately, Legacy’s ‘‘truth’’ campaign was
eviscerated by a reduction in its budget in 2004
when the guaranteed education funding supplied
by the MSA terminated [59]. Yet before this, the
tobacco industry’s repeated efforts to spin positive
messages in response to Legacy’s negative adver-
tisements and to paint the ‘‘truth’’ ads as vilifica-
tion, either through regulatory efforts or through
lawsuits, were repeatedly unsuccessful [48]. The
‘‘truth’’ campaign, like state programs using simi-
lar tactics, was successful at reducing smoking rates
despite share of voice problems faced by all mass
media public health campaigns. Recent research on
tobacco counter marketing campaigns at the state
level has confirmed that ads that use negative emo-
tional appeals are effective in reducing youth smok-
ing rates [94–100], require fewer viewings to
achieve this effect than other types of ads [101]
and are easily remembered [102].
Discussion
Until recently, many public health advocates and
researchers have viewed mass media campaigns
as exercises in information provision, when they
are best viewed as exercises in information framing
[1, 7, 103]. Studies of negative advertising suggest
it may offer public health groups a means to in-
crease the effectiveness of mass media campaigns
despite enormous funding disadvantages. Although
political scientists note potential risks to the use of
negative advertising in political campaigns such as
decreased voter turnout, dissatisfaction with the po-
litical system and polarization [104], systematic
reviews of negative advertising show little evidence
of such outcomes [105], and almost none of these
risks is relevant to its use in public health. Health
behaviors are influenced by social norms [106,
107]; moreover, behavior can be changed by infor-
mation-rich negative advertising [16].
Legacy’s success with ‘‘truth’’ exemplifies the
promise of negative advertising in public health
media campaigns. Legacy’s emphasis on ‘‘truth’’
as a ‘brand’ implicitly conveyed the message that
cigarettes constituted its opposite: lies. The cam-
paign challenged tobacco industry messages by
showing they offered incomplete, misleading and
inaccurate representations of cigarettes and smok-
ing, a denormalization process shown to reduce to-
bacco use [106]. Detailed studies of the ‘‘truth’’
campaign revealed as early as 2001 that these
D. E. Apollonio and R. E. Malone
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advertisements were effective and consistent with
the expectation that attitudes cued by negative ad-
vertising are persistent, the effect does not appear to
decline over time [107], although some evidence
suggests that there are diminishing returns to to-
bacco counter marketing campaigns [100, 108].
The ‘‘truth’’ ads that the industry claimed consti-
tuted vilification were negative advertisements that
Philip Morris’s own internal focus groups showed
conveyed primarily a negative message about to-
bacco rather than tobacco companies; consistent
with other studies [109], this finding suggests that
negative public health advertisements should in-
clude both counter marketing and public health
claims.
Philip Morris quickly identified the power of
negative advertising as the strength behind
Legacy’s campaign. Although Philip Morris argued
that it supported the ‘‘truth’’ campaign in principle,
claiming that many ‘‘truth’’ advertisements were
acceptable to both tobacco companies and public
health activists, its accusations of vilification
against ads that focused viewer attention on the
product suggest that its real goal was to eliminate
the most effective ‘‘truth’’ advertisements. Philip
Morris states it is now comfortable with admissions
that tobacco causes disease [53], but it prefers that
health information be presented in abstract and
‘neutral’ ways [110]. In contrast, effective negative
advertisements, such as Body Bags, provide a pow-
erful interpretive frame for information that makes
it meaningful and relevant to viewers and directly
challenge the veracity of cigarette advertisements,
which suggest smoking is a desirable activity. Such
ads also indirectly counter tobacco industry claims
of ‘responsibility’ [111].
Increasingly, public health advocates face prob-
lems of interpretation as well as problems of behav-
ior. When corporate disease vectors such as the
tobacco industry control interpretive voice through
advertising and promotion, public health-oriented
negative advertising can promote alternative inter-
pretations that disrupt corporate messages. This
reframing may be the most effective long-term
strategy in controlling complex public health prob-
lems that have multiple causes [103]. Negative ad-
vertising is not relevant to every public health
problem, but the recognition that many modern
public health threats revolve around consumption
suggests that negative advertising could be used to
address health problems beyond tobacco. More-
over, public health media campaigns directed to-
ward other products would not be constrained by
ambiguous legal definitions of vilification. This
case study of a highly effective negative advertising
campaign suggests that similar campaigns by other
public health groups could be more aggressive and
effective in addressing the power and resource dif-
ferentials between disease-promoting industries and
public health groups.
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